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Abstract. We perform host-based intrusion detection by constructing a model
from a program’s binary code and then restricting the program’s execution by
the model. We improve the effectiveness of such model-based intrusion detection
systems by incorporating into the model knowledge of the environment in which
the program runs, and by increasing the accuracy of our models with a new data-
ﬂow analysis algorithm for context-sensitive recovery of static data.
The environment—conﬁguration ﬁles, command-line parameters, and envi-
ronment variables—constrains acceptable process execution. Environment de-
pendencies added to a program model update the model to the current environ-
ment at every program execution.
Our new static data-ﬂow analysis associates a program’s data ﬂows with spe-
ciﬁccallingcontextsthatusethedata. Weusethisanalysistodifferentiatesystem-
call arguments ﬂowing from distinct call sites in the program.
Using a new average reachability measure suitable for evaluation of call-stack-
based program models, we demonstrate that our techniques improve the precision
of several test programs’ models from 76% to 100%.
Key words: model-based anomaly detection, Dyck model, static binary analysis, static
data-ﬂow analysis.
1 Introduction
A host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) monitors a process’ execution to iden-
tify potentially malicious behavior. In a model-based anomaly HIDS or behavior-based
HIDS [3], deviations from a precomputedmodel of expected behaviorindicate possible
intrusion attempts. An executionmonitor veriﬁes a stream of events, often system calls,
generated by the executing process. The monitor rejects event streams deviating from
the model.The abilityof the system todetect attacks with few orzerofalse alarms relies
entirely upon the precision of the model.
Static analysis builds an execution model by analyzing the source or binary code
of the program [5, 10,14, 20]. Traditionally, static analysis algorithms are conserva-
tive and producemodels that overapproximatecorrect execution.In particular,previous
statically constructedmodelsallowedexecutionbehaviorspossible in anyexecutionen-
vironment. Processes often read the environment—conﬁguration ﬁles, command-line
parameters, and environment variables known at process load time and ﬁxed for the
entire execution of the process. The environment can signiﬁcantly constrain a process’
execution, disabling entire blocks of functionality and restricting the process’ access.If the process can generate the language of event sequences Le given the current en-
vironment e, then previous program models constructed from static analysis accepted
the language Ls = ∪i∈ELi for E the set of all possible environments. Ls is a super-
set of Le and may contain system call sequences that cannot be generated by correct
execution in environment e.
These overly general models may fail to detect attacks. For example, versions of
the OpenSSH secure-shell server prior to 3.0.2 had a design error that allowed users to
alter the execution of the root-level login process [19]. If the conﬁguration ﬁle setting
“uselogin” was disabled, then the ssh server disabled the vulnerable code. However, an
attacker who has subverted the process can bypass the “uselogin” checks by directly
executing the vulnerable code. Previous statically constructed models allowed all paths
in theprogram,includingthe disabledpath.By executingthedisabledcode,the attacker
can undetectably execute root-level commands.
In this paper,we make statically constructedprogrammodels sensitive to the execu-
tion environment. An environment-sensitive program model restricts process execution
behavior to only the behavior correct in the current environment. The model accepts a
limited language of event sequences Lv, where Le ⊆ Lv ⊆ Ls. Event sequences that
could not be correctly generated in the current environment are detected as intrusive,
even if those sequences are correct in some other environment. In the OpenSSH exam-
ple, if “uselogin” was disabled, then the model disallows system calls and system-call
arguments reachable only via the vulnerable code paths. The model detects an entire
class of evasion attacks that manipulate environment data, as described in Sect. 7.4.
Environment dependencies characterize how execution behavior depends upon en-
vironment values. Similar to def-use relations in static data-ﬂow analysis [15], an en-
vironment dependency relates values in the environment, such as “uselogin”, to values
of internal program variables. When an environment-sensitive HIDS loads a program
model for execution enforcement, it customizes the model to the current environment
based upon these dependencies. In this paper, we manually identify dependencies. Our
long-term goal is to automate this procedure, and in Sect. 5.3 we postulate that auto-
mated identiﬁcation will not be an onerous task.
Environment sensitivity works best with system-call argument analysis. Our static
analyzer includes powerful data-ﬂow analysis to recover statically known system-call
arguments. Different execution paths in a program may set a system-call argument dif-
ferently. Our previous data-ﬂow analysis recovered argument values without calling
context, in that the analysis algorithm ignored the association between an argument
value and the call site that set that value [9,10]. In this work, we encode calling context
with argument values to better model the correct execution behavior of a program. A
system-call argument value observed at runtime must match the calling context leading
up to the system call. Additionally, the data-ﬂow analysis now crosses shared object
boundaries, enabling static analysis of dynamically-linkedexecutables.
Althoughenvironment-sensitiveprogrammodelingistheprimaryfocusofourwork,
wemakeanadditionalcontribution:a newevaluationmetric.Theexistingstandardmet-
ric measuring model precision, average branching factor, poorly evaluates models that
monitor a program’s call stack in addition to the system-call stream [5,8]. We instead
use context-free language reachability to move forward through stack events to dis-cover the next set of actual system calls reachable from the current program location.
Our new average reachabilitymeasure fairlyevaluates the precisionof programmodels
that include function call and return events. Using the average reachability measure, we
demonstrate the value of whole-program data-ﬂow analysis and environment-sensitive
models. On four test programs, we improved the precision of context-sensitive models
from 76% to 100%.
In summary, we believe that this paper makes the following contributions:
– Staticmodelconstructionofdynamically-linkedexecutables.Inparticular,thestatic
analyzer continues data-ﬂow analysis across shared-object boundaries by learning
the API by which programs call library code, as described in Sect. 4.1.
– Context-sensitiveencodingofrecoveredsystem-callarguments,detailedinSect.4.2.
Combined with whole-program analysis, this technique improved argument recov-
ery by 61% to 100% in our experiments.
– A formal deﬁnition of environment-sensitive program models and methods to en-
code environment dependencies into statically constructed program models. Envi-
ronment sensitivity and static system-call argument recovery improved the preci-
sion of program models by 76% to 100%. Section 5 presents this work.
– An extension to the commonly-used average branching factor metric suitable for
program models that require update events for function calls and returns (Sect. 6).
The average reachability measure provides a fairer comparison of call-stack-based
models and other models that do not monitor the call stack.
2 Related Work
In1994,Fix andSchneideraddedexecutionenvironmentinformationtoa programming
logic to make program speciﬁcations more precise [7]. The logic better speciﬁed how
a program would execute, allowing for more precise analysis of the program in a proof
system. Their notion of environment was general, including properties such as sched-
uler behavior. We are proposing a similar idea: use environment information to more
precisely characterize expected program behavior in a program model. As our models
describe safety properties that must not be violated, we focus on environment aspects
that can constrain the safety properties.
Chinchani et al. instrumented C source-code with security checks based upon envi-
ronment information [1]. Their deﬁnition of environment primarily encompassed low-
level properties of the physical machine on which a process executes. For example,
knowing the number of bits per integer allowed the authors to insert code into a pro-
gram to prevent integer overﬂows. This approach is speciﬁc to known exploit vectors
and requires source-codeediting, making it poorly suited for our environment-sensitive
intrusion detection.
One aspect of our current work uses environment dependencies and static analysis
to limit allowed values to system-call arguments. This speciﬁc problem has received
prior attention.
Static analysis can identify constant, statically known arguments. While extracting
execution models from C source code, Wagner and Dean identiﬁed arguments knownkernel trap unlink
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Fig.1. Prior static argument recovery. Argument values recovered along different execution paths
jointogether whentheexecution paths converge. (A) Theassociation betweenaspeciﬁcargument
value and an execution path is lost. (B) If an argument value cannot be statically recovered on
any execution path leading to a system call, all other recovered values must be discarded. The
argument is completely unconstrained
statically [20]. In earlier work, we used binary code analysis to recover arguments in
SPARC executables [9,10]. These efforts suffered from several problems:
– Earlier binary data-ﬂow analysis required statically-linked executables. In this pa-
per, we use data-ﬂow analysis to learn the API for a shared object. When analyzing
an executable, we continue data-ﬂow analysis anywhere the library API is used.
– Values recovered were not sensitive to calling context. This forces two inaccura-
cies. First, the association between a system-call argument value and the execution
path using that value is lost (Fig. 1A). An attacker could undetectably use a value
recovered on one execution path on any other execution path to the same system
call. Second, if any execution path set an argument in a way not recoverable stati-
cally, all values recovered along all other execution paths must be discarded for the
analysis to be safe (Fig. 1B). Our current work avoids these two inaccuracies by
encoding calling context with recovered values.
– Static analysis cannot recover values set dynamically. In this paper, we make a
distinction between dynamic values set at load time and values set by arbitrary user
input. Environment dependencies augment static analysis and describe how values
set when the operating system loads a process ﬂow to system-call arguments.
Dynamicanalysislearnsaprogrammodelbygeneralizingbehaviorobservedduring
a trainingphase. Kruegel et al. [13] and Sekar et al. [16] used dynamic analysis to learn
constraints for system-call arguments. These constraints will include values from the
environment that are used as part of a system-call argument, which forces a tradeoff.
Thetrainingphasecouldmodifyenvironmentvaluestolearnageneralmodel,butsucha
modelfails to constrainlater executionto the speciﬁc environment.Conversely,training
could use only the current environment.If the environmentever changes,however,then
the model no longer characterizes correct execution and retraining becomes necessary.
By includingenvironmentdependenciesdescribed in this paper,learning could be doneStatic Binary
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Fig.2. Architecture
only for arguments not dependent upon the environment. Environment dependencies
wouldresolvetheremainingargumentstothecurrentenvironmenteverytimethemodel
was subsequently loaded.
Environment-sensitivemodels are well suited to the model-carryingcode execution
design. Sekar et al. proposed that unknown, untrusted executables can include models
of their execution[16]. A consumer of the executablecan use a model checker to verify
that the model does not violate their security policy and an execution monitor to limit
the program’sexecutionto that allowed bythe model. Thecode producermust buildthe
program model, but they cannot know any consumer’s speciﬁc execution environment.
To avoid false alarms, the modelmust be generalto suit all possible environments.Such
a general model may not satisfy a consumer’s security policy. If the code producer
adds environment dependencies to the model shipped with the code, the model will
automatically adapt to every consumer’s unique environment. With the environment
constraints, the model is increasingly likely to satisfy a consumer’s security policy.
3 Overview
Model-basedanomalydetectionhas two phases: constructionofthe programmodeland
execution enforcement using the model. Environment sensitivity affects both phases.
Figure 2 shows the overall architecture of our system, including how environment in-
formationis used in each phase.Analysis, at the left, occurs once per programor shared
object. The globalmodel builder assembles all executionmodels into the single, whole-
program model. The panel on the right, execution monitoring, occurs every time the
program is loaded for execution.
The static analyzer builds a model of expected execution by reconstructing and an-
alyzing control ﬂows in a binary executable. The control ﬂow model that we construct
is the Dyck model, a context-sensitive model that uses a ﬁnite-state machine to enforce
ordering upon system-call events as well as correct function call and return behav-
ior [10]. The static analyzer encodes environment dependencies into the Dyck model.1
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void parse args(int argc, char **argv) {
char *tn = tempnam(getenv("TMP"), "Mx");
int execmode = 1;
char c;
unlink("/home/user/tmpfile");
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "L:")) != -1)
switch (c) {
case ’L’:
execmode = 0;
unlink(tn);
link(optarg, tn);
break;
}
if (execmode)
exec("/sbin/mail");
}
Fig.3. Example code, with calls to C library system-
call wrapper functions in boldface. Although we analyze
SPARC binary code, we show C source code for read-
ability. For conciseness, we omit error-handling code com-
monly required when calling C library functions
("/sbin/mail") exec (?,?) link
(?) unlink
(?) unlink
Fig.4. A ﬁnite-state machine model
of the code. System calls include
argument restrictions identiﬁed by
static data-ﬂow analysis
Environment dependencies describe the relationship between a value in the execution
environment and a variable in the program, as detailed further in Sect. 5.
A separateprocess,the runtimemonitor,onlyallows processexecutionthat matches
the programmodel.The monitorresolvesenvironmentdependenciesin the Dyckmodel
given the actual environment in which the process is about to execute. By parsing the
program’s command line, its conﬁguration ﬁles, and the system’s environment vari-
ables, the monitor knows the execution environment when the operating system loads
the program. It prunes portions of the model corresponding to code unreachable in the
current environment by determining the directions that branches dependent upon the
environment will take. It similarly propagates environment values along dependencies
to update system-call argument constraints before the monitored process begins execu-
tion. The model used for execution veriﬁcation thus enforces restrictions arising from
environment dependencies.
Consider the example function in Fig. 3. Although the ﬁgure shows C source code
for readability, we analyze SPARC binary code in our experiments. This code uses
environment information in ways similar to many real programs. The getenv call
in line 2 returns the value of the environment variable TMP, which typically speci-
ﬁes the system’s directory for temporary ﬁles. The returned directory name is used by
the tempnam call to construct a ﬁlename in the temporary directory. The ﬁlename is
used by the link and unlink system calls in lines 11 and 12. The getopt function
call in line 7 parses options passed to the program via the command line and sets the
value of the C library global variable optarg. The option “–L” requires one argument,
optarg, that is passed as an argument to link at line 12. If the command line contains
the “–L” option, the case statement at line 9 will execute and the exec at line 17 willnot execute.If “–L” is not present, then the opposite holds: the exec will execute but the
code inside the case statement will be skipped.
Figure 4 shows the ﬁnite-state machine model constructed for parse args using ear-
lier static analysis methods [9,10]. This model overapproximates the correct execution
of the function:
– The argument to both unlink calls is unconstrained, so an attacker could unde-
tectably delete any ﬁle in a directory to which the process holds write access. The
arguments are not statically recovered because the unlink at line 11 depends upon
a dynamic value, the environment variable TMP. Both unlink calls target the same
C library system-call wrapper function. Data-ﬂow analysis of the system-call argu-
ment will join the values propagatingfrom both call sites, as in Fig. 1B. Joining the
statically recovered value from line 6 with the unknown value from line 11 forces
the analyzer to discard the known value.
– Both arguments to link are unconstrained because they are computed dynamically
from the execution environment.
– The two system calls inside the case statement and the exec system call are al-
ways accepted. In particular, all three calls would be accepted together. The branch
correlationthat forces either the case statement or the exec to executehas beenlost.
At ﬁrst glance, the exec call appears safe because static analysis can constrain its argu-
ment value. However, due to the overapproximationsin the model described above, the
model accepts a sequence of system calls that will execute a shell process. The attack
ﬁrst issues a nop call [21] and then relinks the statically recovered ﬁlename to a shell
before the exec call occurs:
unlink(NULL); // Nop call
unlink("/sbin/mail");
link("/bin/sh", "/sbin/mail");
exec("/sbin/mail");
Note that the attack requires the initial nop call because the link transition in the model
is preceded by two unlink transitions.
Environment sensitivity and the static argument analysis presented in this paper
repair these imprecisions and produce a program model that better represents correct
execution. Context-sensitive encoding of system-call arguments will differentiate the
values passed from the two unique call sites to the unlink system-call wrapper, en-
abling recovery of the static argument at the line 6 call site even without recoveringthe
argumentat line 11. Addingenvironmentdependenciesthen producesthe environment-
sensitive model shown in Fig. 5. The model is a template, containing dependencies that
must be resolved by the execution monitor.
The monitor instantiates the template model in the current environment. Suppose
the environment variable TMP is set to /tmp. For a command line without “–L”, the
unreachable case statement code is removed (Fig. 6A). For the command line “-L
/home/user/log”, the monitor will prune the unreachable exec call and constrain
possible values to the remaining system-call arguments (Fig. 6B). The model better re-
ﬂects correct execution in the speciﬁc environment. In both cases, the model prevents
the relinking attack previously described.("/home/user/tmpfile") unlink
("/sbin/mail") exec ("[L]", "[TMP]/Mx.*") link
("[TMP]/Mx.*") unlink
L+ L−
Fig.5. The environment-sensitive model produced by thestatic analyzer. Themodel isa template,
containing environment dependencies that are resolved when the model is loaded. The symbols
L- and L+ are branch predicates that allow subsequent system calls when the command-line pa-
rameter “–L” is omitted or present, respectively. The value [L] is the parameter value following
“–L” on the command line. The value [TMP] is the value of the TMP environment variable
("/home/user/tmpfile") unlink
("/sbin/mail") exec link("/home/user/log", "/tmp/Mx.*")
("/home/user/tmpfile") unlink
("/tmp/Mx.*") unlink
(A) (B)
Fig.6. The environment-sensitive model, after the execution monitor has resolved environment
dependencies. System-call arguments are encoded with calling context, so different calls to un-
link enforce different arguments. String arguments are regular expressions. (A) When the com-
mand line does not contain “–L”, the code processing the option is pruned from the model.
(B) When “–L” is present, the exec call is unreachable and pruned
4 System-Call Argument Analysis
Our analyzer attempts to recoversystem-call argumentsthat are statically known. It an-
alyzes data ﬂows within program code and into shared object code to determine how
arguments may be constrained. The execution monitor enforces restrictions on any re-
coveredsystem-call argumentsand rejects any system call that attempts to use incorrect
argument values.
4.1 Learning a Library API
The objectcodeof a programis linkedat two distinct times. Static linkingoccursas part
of a compilation process and combines object code to form a single program or shared
object ﬁle. Runtime linking happens every time a program is loaded for execution and
links code in separate shared objects with the main executable. Static analyzers inspect
object code after static linking but before the ﬁnal runtime link. Our analyzer simulatesthe effects of the runtime link to build models for programs whose code is distributed
among shared object ﬁles. This model construction has two primary steps.
First, we analyze all shared objects used by a program. We build models for the
program code in each shared object and cache the models on disk for future reuse.
Our programmodels include virtual memoryaddresses of kernel traps and functioncall
sites; however, the addresses used by shared object code are not known until runtime
linking occurs. The analyzer performssymbolic relocation for shared object code. Each
sharedobjectis givenits ownvirtualaddressspace indexedat 0that is strictly symbolic,
and all addresses used in models reside in the symbolic address space. When later en-
forcing a program model, our execution monitor detects the actual address at which
the runtime linker maps shared object code and resolves all symbolic addresses to their
actual virtual addresses.
Second,we analyze the binary executableof interest. The executablemay call func-
tionsthatexistinsharedobjectcode.Ouranalyzersimulatestheruntimelinker’ssymbol
resolution to identify the code body targeted by the dynamic function call. It reads the
cached model of the shared object’s code from disk and incorporates it into the pro-
gram’s execution model.
The separate code analysis performed for each shared object and for the main exe-
cutable complicates data-ﬂow analysis for system-call argument recovery.System calls
generally appear only within C library functions. Frequently, however, the argument
values used at those system calls are set by the main executable and passed to the C
library throughsome function in the library’s API. Separate analysis of the library code
and the main executable code precludes our previous static data-ﬂow analysis from re-
covering these arguments. The data ﬂow is broken at the library interface.
To remedy this problem, we now perform whole-program data-ﬂow analysis to
track data ﬂowing between separate statically linked object ﬁles. The analyzer ﬁrst
learns the API of a shared object. It initiates data-ﬂow analysis at system-call sites with
type information for the call’s arguments (e.g. integer argument or string argument).
Data-ﬂow analysis follows program control ﬂows in reverse to ﬁnd the instructions that
affect argument values. If any value depends upon a formal argument of a globally vis-
ible function, then that function is a part of the API that affects system-call arguments.
We cache a data-ﬂowsummary function [17] that characterizes how data ﬂows fromthe
API function’s entry point to the system-call site in the shared object. For example, one
summary function for the C library stipulates that the ﬁrst argumentof the function call
unlink ﬂows through to the ﬁrst argument of the subsequent unlink system call.
When later analyzing an object ﬁle that utilizes a learned API, we continue data-
ﬂow analysis at all calls to the API. The analyzer attempts to statically recover the
value passed to the API call. By composing the cached data-ﬂow summary function
with data dependencies to the API call site discovered via object code analysis, we can
recover the argument value used at the system call inside the library.
4.2 Context-Sensitive Argument Recovery
Static argument recovery uses data-ﬂow analysis to identify system-call values that are
statically known. The analysis recovers argumentsusing a ﬁnite-height lattice of values
andanalgebrathat deﬁneshowto combinevaluesinthe lattice. Thelattice has a bottomelement (⊥) that indicates nothing is known about an argument because the argument
has not been analyzed. The top element (⊤) is the most general value and means that
an argument could not be determined statically.
Argumentvalues may reach a system call via multiple, different execution paths, as
shown in Fig. 1. The algebra of the lattice deﬁnes how to compute the value that will
ﬂow down the converged execution path. The join operator (⊔) combines values. Our
previous static argument analysis [10] recovered arguments using a standard powerset
lattice P. For S the ﬁnite set of statically known strings and integers used by the pro-
gram, lattice values were elements of DP = P(S) with ⊥P= ∅ and ⊤P = S. The
algebra joined arguments with set union: A ⊔P B = A ∪ B for A and B any lattice
values. The value reaching the system-call site is the recovered argument.
Joins in lattice P diminish the precision of the analysis. The set union does not
maintain the association between an argument value and the execution path using that
value. As a result, an attacker can undetectably use a value recovered on one path on
any other execution path reaching the system call. Suppose a program opens both a
temporary ﬁle with write privileges and a critical ﬁle with read-only access. Even if
argument recovery can identify all arguments, the calling context is lost. The attacker
can use the write privilege from the temporary-ﬁle open to open the critical ﬁle with
write privilege as well.
Worse yet is the effect of values not recovered statically. If an argument cannot be
identiﬁed on one execution path, it takes the value ⊤P. At a point of convergingexecu-
tion, such as the entry point of a C library function, the join of ⊤P with any recovered
value A discards the recovered value because A ⊔P ⊤P = ⊤P. This makes intuitive
sense: when monitoring execution, the monitor cannot determine when a recovered
value should be enforced without knowing the calling context of the value.
We solve this imprecision by extending the lattice domain to include calling con-
text. Our new data-ﬂow analysis annotates the recovered string and integer values with
the address of the call site that passes the strings or integers as an argument. Stated
differently: we recover values using a separate powerset lattice for each calling con-
text. As a data value propagates through a call instruction, the analyzer annotates the
value with the return address of the call. We have found that a single call site provides
enoughcontext to sufﬁciently distinguish argumentvalues, althoughthis analysis could
be extended to include additional calling context as necessary. Note that the call site
annotation is not the call site nearest to the system call, but rather the originating call
site where the argument is ﬁrst set. The originating call site may target any function
in the program, including C library calls or arbitrary wrapper functions around library
functions.
Data values recovered by our data-ﬂow analysis are pairs (A,c), where A ∈ DP is
a set of integers or strings as above, and c is the calling context information.
Deﬁnition 1. Let P be the powerset lattice over the set S of all statically-knownstrings
and integers used in the program, as deﬁned above. Let C = {c0,...,cn} be call
site identiﬁers, with c0 = ∅ the special identiﬁer indicating that no context informa-
tion is known. Let Q be the context-sensitive data-ﬂow lattice deﬁned with domain
DQ = P(DP × C), ⊥Q= {(⊥P,∅)}, and ⊤Q =
Sn
i=0 {(⊤P,ci)}.entry unlink libc:
kernel trap unlink
unlink call unlink call
via callsite 1
arg is unknown
via callsite 1
callsite 2 callsite 1
via callsite 2
arg ∈ {“/home/user/testﬁle”}
arg ∈ {“/home/user/testﬁle”}
Fig.7. Static argument recovery with context-
sensitive argument values
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Fig.8. The model for the program code of
Fig. 3 with context-sensitive argument val-
ues. Notethat theargument isconstrained on
the top-most unlink transition even though
the argument at another unlink call site
could not be statically determined
Let A,B ∈ DQ be A = {(Ai,xi)}i and B = {(Bj,yj)}j with ∀i : Ai ∈ DP,xi ∈
C; ∀j : Bj ∈ DP,yj ∈ C; and x0 = ∅ = y0. Deﬁne the join operator ⊔Q as:
A ⊔Q B = {(Ai ⊔P Bj,xi)|xi = yj} ∪ (1)
∪{(Ai ⊔P B0,xi)|  ∃j xi = yj} ∪ {(Bj ⊔P A0,yj)|  ∃i xi = yj}. (2)
The join operationof Q maintains calling contextinformationat points of execution
path convergence.Part (1) joins values in the powerset lattice P only when those values
have identical calling context. Part (2) maintains correctness when joining against a
value that does not yet have context: the value may occur in any previously-identiﬁed
context. The lattice Q improves prior data-ﬂow analysis in two important ways:
1. The convergence of a context-sensitive value with an unrecovered value is non-
destructive. The analyzer can continue to propagate the known value with execu-
tion context (Fig. 7). Figure 8 shows the model for the example code with context-
sensitive arguments. The statically known ﬁlename passed to the ﬁrst call to un-
link (call site 1 in Fig. 7) constrains that call. Intuitively, we need not discard the
recoveredcontext-sensitive value because the monitor, at runtime, can compare the
value’s context information with the executing process’ call stack to determine if
the argument restriction should be enforced.
2. When multiple context-sensitive values converge, no information is lost. Distinct
calling contexts remain distinct. By preserving context, we can enforce the asso-
ciation between multiple arguments passed to a system call at the same call site.
Recall the previous example of opening both a temporary ﬁle and a critical ﬁle
with different access privileges. Since our analysis will annotate both the ﬁlename
and the access mode at each call site with that site’s calling context, an attacker
cannot open the critical ﬁle with anything other than read-only access.
The monitor enforces an argument restriction only when the execution path fol-
lowed to the system call contains the call-site address annotating the argument value.
The monitor walks the call stack of the process at every system call to identify the call-
ing context of the system call. If the call-site address that annotates a value exists inthe calling context, the monitor enforces the corresponding argument restriction. If no
argument was recoveredfor a particular context, the monitor will not constrain allowed
values at runtime.
5 Environment-Sensitive Models
Environment-sensitive intrusion detection further restricts allowed process execution
based upon the known, ﬁxed data in the execution environment. Environment-sensitive
program models do not include the data directly, but rather encode dependencies to en-
vironment data that will be evaluated immediately before the process begins execution.
We ﬁrst formalize the notions of environmentproperties and dependenciesbetween
the environment and a program.
Deﬁnition 2. The environment is program input known at process load time and ﬁxed
for the entire execution of the process.
This includes environment variables, command-line parameters, and conﬁguration ﬁle
contents. The deﬁnition excludes environment variables altered or overwritten during
execution. In our measurements, only about 3% of the programs installed with Solaris
8 modify at least one environment variable.
Deﬁnition 3. A property of the environment is a single variable, parameter, or conﬁg-
uration setting in a ﬁle.
A property may be present or omitted in the environment, and, if present, may have an
associated value. An environment dependency captures the relation between environ-
ment properties and the program’s execution behavior.
Deﬁnition 4. Let E be the set of all environments containing property x. Let I be the
set of all non-environment program inputs. Let V alue(p,d,e,i) denote the possibly-
inﬁnite set of values program point p may read from data location d given environment
e and program input i. An environment dependency exists between x and p if
∃f,d
￿
∀e ∈ E ∀i ∈ I [V alue(p,d,e,i) = f(p,x)]
￿
.
In words: over all possible executions, a program data value at p depends only upon
the value of x. The function f characterizes how the data value depends upon the envi-
ronment property.
The deﬁnition is intuitively similar to the deﬁnition of a def-use relation in pro-
gramming language analysis [15]. The environment deﬁnes a data value that is later
used by the executing process. Where existing program analyses examine only rela-
tions between instructions in the program, we extend the notion of value deﬁnition to
the environment.
Dependencies are of interest only if they affect program behavior visible to the exe-
cution monitor. We focus on two classes of dependencies, both of which are present in
the examplecode of Fig. 3. Control-ﬂow dependenciesexist at programbrancheswhere
the branchdirectionfolloweddependsuponan environmentproperty.Data-ﬂowdepen-
dencies occur when a visible data value, such as a system-call argument, is dependent
upon the environment. The value of the environment property ﬂows to the system-call
argument.("/home/user/tmpfile") unlink
("/sbin/mail") exec (?,?) link
(?) unlink
L+ L−
Fig.9. Dyck model with environment branch dependencies. The symbols L- and L+ are branch
predicates that allow subsequent system calls when the command-line parameter “–L” is omitted
or present, respectively
5.1 Control-Flow Dependencies
Control-ﬂow dependencies restrict allowed execution paths based upon the values of
the environment. The variable tested at a program branch may be dependent upon an
environment property. For example, the if statement of line 16 guards the exec call
so that it executes only when “–L” is omitted from the command line. The program’s
data variable used in the branch test is dependent upon “–L”, as in Deﬁnition 4. As an
immediate consequence, the branch direction followed depends upon “–L”. Similarly,
theswitchstatement at line8 hasan environmentcontrol-ﬂowdependencyupon“–L”
and will execute the case at line 9 only when “–L” is present.
The static analyzer can encodecontrol-ﬂowdependenciesinto the Dyck modelwith
predicate transitions. Figure 9 shows the model of Fig. 8 with predicate transitions
characterizingthe environmentdependency.The predicateL- is satisﬁed onlywhenthe
command line does not contain “–L”. Likewise, L+ is satisﬁed when “–L” is present.
The execution monitor evaluates predicate transitions when loading the model for a
programabout to execute.Predicates satisﬁed by the environmentbecomeǫ-transitions.
An ǫ-transition is transparent and allows all events following the transition. Conversely,
the monitor deletes edges with predicates that are not satisﬁed by the environment, as
legitimate process execution cannot follow that path. If the command line passed to the
example code of Fig. 3 does not contain “–L”, then the L- transition in Fig. 9 will allow
the subsequent exec and the L+ transition will be removed to prevent the model from
accepting the following unlink and link calls.
5.2 Data-Flow Dependencies
System-call argument values may also depend upon environment properties. In partic-
ular, programs frequently use environment values when computing strings passed to
system calls as ﬁlenames. These values can signiﬁcantly restrict the allowed access of
the process, and hence an attacker that has subverted the process. In the example code
(Fig. 3), the environmentvariable TMP gives the system temporarydirectoryused as the
preﬁx to the ﬁlename argument of lines 11 and 12. The property constrains the unlinkat line 11 so that the only ﬁles it could remove are temporary ﬁles. The parameter to
the command-line property “–L” fully deﬁnes the ﬁlename passed as the ﬁrst argument
to link. Many real-world programs exhibit similar behavior. The Apache web server,
for example, uses the command-line property “–d” to specify the server’s root direc-
tory [11].
Environment data-ﬂow dependencies augment existing system-call arguments re-
covered using techniques from Sect. 4. Figure 5 adds argument dependencies to the
previous model of Fig. 9. A bracketed environment property indicates that the argu-
ment is simply a template value and must be instantiated with the actual value of the
property at program load time.
Figure 5 is the completed environment-sensitiveDyck model with context-sensitive
argument encoding. When the program of Fig. 3 is loaded for execution, the monitor
reads the current environmentand instantiates the model in that environment.Template
argument values are replaced with the actual values of the environmentproperties upon
with the argumentdepends.The ﬁnal, instantiated models appear in Fig. 6, as described
in Sect. 3.
5.3 Dependency Identiﬁcation
This paper aims to demonstrate the value of environment-sensitive intrusion detection
and does not yet consider the problem of automated dependency identiﬁcation. We
assume that environment dependencies have been precomputed or manually speciﬁed.
In our later experiments, we manually identiﬁed environment dependencies via it-
erative model reﬁnement. At a high-level, this process parallels counterexample-guided
abstraction reﬁnement used in software model checking: the Dyck model is an abstrac-
tion deﬁning correct execution, and we iteratively reﬁne the model with environment
dependencies to improve the abstraction [2]. We monitored a process’ execution and
collected a trace of reachable and potentially malicious system calls as described in
Sect. 6. The trace included the calling context in which each potentially malicious call
occurred. We inspected the program’s code to determine if either:
– The argument passed to a call-site in the calling context depended upon environ-
ment information and reached the system call; or
– A branch guarded one of the call-sites and the branch predicate depended upon the
environment.
Function-call arguments and branch predicates depend upon the environment if a back-
ward slice of the value reaches a function known to read the environment, such as
getenv or getopt. We added the dependency to the Dyck model and repeated the
iteration. In practice, the number of dependencies added via iterative reﬁnement was
small: each program in our experiments contained between 10 and 24 dependencies.
Manual speciﬁcation clearly has drawbacks. It requires the user to understand low-
level process executionbehaviorand Dyckmodel characteristics.Manual workis error-
prose and can miss dependencies obscured by control-ﬂows that are difﬁcult to com-
prehend. However, we believe that dependency identiﬁcation is not limited to manual
speciﬁcation.We postulate that automated techniques to identify environment dependencies with
little or no direction by an analyst are certainly feasible. Summary functions for C li-
brarycalls that read the environmentwould enable our existing static data-ﬂowanalysis
to automatically construct environment-dependent execution constraints. Complex de-
pendencies could be learned via dynamic analysis. A dynamic trace analyzer could
correlate environment properties with features of an execution trace to produce depen-
dencies.
Thispapermakesclear thebeneﬁts ofmodelspecializationbaseduponenvironment
dependencies.The improvementsnotedin Sect. 7 motivatethe needfor implementation
of the techniques to automatically identify dependencies. We expect future work will
address these implementation issues.
6 Average Reachability Measure
Measurements of a model’s precision and its ability to prevent attacks indicate the ben-
eﬁts of various analyses and model construction techniques. Previous papers have mea-
sured model precision using the average branching factor metric [5,9,10,20,22]. This
metric computes the average opportunity for an attacker who has subverted a process’
execution to undetectably execute a malicious system call. After processing a system
call, the monitor inspects the program model to determine the set of calls that it would
accept next. All potentially malicious system calls in the set, such as unlink with an
unconstrained argument, contribute to the branching factor of the current monitor con-
ﬁguration. The average of these counts over the entire execution of the monitor is the
averagebranchingfactorofthemodel.Lowernumbersindicatebetterprecision,asthere
is less opportunity to undetectably insert a malicious call. The set of potentially mali-
cious system calls was originallydeﬁnedby Wagner [22] and has remainedconstant for
all subsequent work using average branching factor.
Average branching factor poorly evaluates context-sensitive program models with
stack update events, such as the Dyck model used in this paper. Typical programs have
two characteristics that limit the suitability of average branching factor:
– Programs often have many more function calls and returns than system calls. The
number of stack update events processed by the monitor will be greater than the
number of actual system-call events.
– Programs rarely execute a system-call trap directly. Rather, programs indirectly
invoke system calls by calling C library functions.
Thesecharacteristicshaveimportantimplicationsforboththestreamofeventsobserved
by the monitor and the structure of the Dyck model. The ﬁrst characteristic implies that
stack updates dominate the event stream. The second characteristic implies that at any
given conﬁguration of the monitor, the set of events accepted next are predominantly
safe stack updateevents thatdo notcontributeto the conﬁguration’sbranchingfactor.In
fact, a potentiallymalicious system call is not visible as the next possible event until the
process’executionpathhasenteredtheC libraryfunctionandthemonitorhasprocessed
thecorrespondingstackeventforthatfunctioncall.Thenumberofpotentiallymalicious
system calls visible to the monitor decreases, artiﬁcially skewing the computed averageTable1. Test programs, workloads, and instruction counts. Instruction counts include instructions
from any shared objects used by the program
Program Workload Instruction Count
procmail Filter a 1 MB message to a local mailbox. 374,103
mailx Send mode: send one ASCII message. 207,977
Receive mode: check local mailbox for new email.
gzip Compress 13 MB of ASCII text. 196,242
cat Write 13 MB of ASCII text to a ﬁle. 185,844
branching factor downward. The call-stack-based model is not as precise as its average
branching factor makes it appear.
We have extended average branching factor so that it correctly evaluates context-
sensitivemodelswithstackupdateeventsanddoesnotskewresults. Ouraveragereach-
ability measure uses context-freelanguage reachability [23] to identify the set of actual
systemcalls reachablefromthecurrentconﬁgurationofthemonitor.Ratherthansimply
inspectingthenexteventsthatthemonitormayaccept,theaveragereachabilitymeasure
walks forward through all stack events until reaching actual system calls. The forward
inspection respects call-and-return semantics of stack events to limit the reachable set
of system calls to only those that monitor operation could eventually reach. After each
actual system-call event, we recalculate the set of reachable system calls and count the
number that are potentially malicious. The sum of these counts divided by the number
of system calls generated by the process is the average reachability measure.
The average reachability measure subsumes average branching factor. Both met-
rics have the identical meaning for context-insensitive models and for context-sensitive
models without stack events, such as Wagner and Dean’s abstractstack model [20],and
will compute the same value for these model types. Average reachability measures for
call-stack-based models may be directly compared against measures for other models,
allowing better understanding of the differences among the various model types.
We implementedthe averagereachabilitymeasureusing the post*algorithmfrom
push-down systems (PDS) research [4]. We convertedthe Dyck model into a PDS rule-
set and generated post* queries following each system call. The post* algorithm is
the same as that used by Wagner and Dean to operate their abstract stack model. Note
that we use the expensive post* algorithm for evaluation purposes only; the monitor
still veriﬁes event streams via the efﬁcient Dyck model.
7 Experimental Results
We evaluated the precision of environment-sensitive program models using average
reachability. A precise model closely represents the program for which it was con-
structed and offers an adversary little ability to execute attacks undetected. To be use-
ful, models utilizing environment sensitivity and our argument analysis should show
improvement over our previous best techniques [5,10]. On test programs, our static
argument recovery improved precision by 61%–100%. Adding environment sensitivity
to the models increased the gains to 76%–100%. We end by arguing that model-basedprocmail
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Fig.10. Precision of program models with increasing sensitivity to data-ﬂows and the environ-
ment. The y-axis indicates precision using the average reachability measure: the average number
of reachable and potentially malicious system calls. Lower numbers indicate greater precision
and less opportunity for attack. All programs have 4 bars; bars that do not show on the graph
have value less than 0.01
intrusion detection systems that ignore environment information leave themselves sus-
ceptible to evasion attacks.
7.1 Test Programs
We measured model precision for four example UNIX programs. Table 1 shows work-
loads and instruction counts for the programs tested. Note that instruction counts in-
clude instructions from all shared objects on which the program depends. Procmail
additionally uses code in shared objects loaded explicitly by the program via dlopen.
As our static analyzer does not currently identify libraries loaded with dlopen, we
manually added the dependencies to this program.
These programs, our static analyzer, and our runtime monitor run on Solaris 8 on
SPARC. The monitor executes as a separate process that traces a process’ executionvia
theSolaris/procﬁlesystem.TogeneratestackeventsfortheDyckmodel,themonitor
walks the call stack of the process before every system call, as done by Feng et al. [6].
By design, the full execution environment of the traced process is visible to the moni-
tor. The environment is actually passed to the monitor, and the monitor then forks and
executes the traced process in that environment with an environment-sensitivemodel.
7.2 Effects of Static Argument Analysis
We used average reachability to evaluate models constructed for these four test pro-
grams. We compared three different versions of the Dyck model using varying degrees
of static data-ﬂow analysis (Fig. 10). We report two sets of results for mailx because
it has two major modes of execution, sending and receiving mail, that produce signiﬁ-
cantly different execution behavior. Other programs with modes, such as compressing
or decompressing data in gzip, did not exhibit notable changes in precision measure-
ments.Table 2. Environment dependencies in our test programs. We manually identiﬁed the dependen-
cies via inspection of source code and object code
Program Environment dependencies
procmail • Program branching depends upon “–d” command-line argument.
• Program branching depends upon “–r” command-line argument.
• Filename opened depends upon user’s home directory.
mailx • Program branching depends upon “–T” command-line argument.
• Program branching depends upon “–u” command-line argument.
• Program branching depends upon “–n” command-line argument.
• Filename created depends upon the parameter to the “–T” command-line argument.
• Filename opened depends upon the TMP environment variable.
• Filename opened depends upon the user’s home directory.
• Filename unlinked depends upon the TMP environment variable.
gzip • Argument to chown depends upon the ﬁlename on the command line.
• Argument to chmod depends upon the ﬁlename on the command line.
• Filename unlinked depends upon the ﬁlename on the command line.
cat • Filename opened depends upon the ﬁlename on the command-line.
First, we used a Dyck model without any data-ﬂow analysis for system-call ar-
gument recovery. Although there is some overlap between our current test programs
and test programs previously used with a Dyck model [10], we reiterate that the re-
sults computed here by the average reachability measure are not comparable to average
branching factor numbers previously reported for the Dyck model. Our current results
may be compared with previous average branching factor numbers for non-stack-based
models [9,20].
Second, we added system-call argument constraints to the Dyck model when the
constraints could have been recovered by a previously reported analysis technique [9,
10,20]. Arguments values are recovered only when a value is recovered along all ex-
ecution paths reaching a system call. If the value from one execution path cannot be
identiﬁed statically, then the entire argument value is unknown. Furthermore, any data-
ﬂows that cross between a shared object and the programare consideredunknown.This
limited data-ﬂow analysis improved model precision from 0% to 20%.
Last, we enabled all static data-ﬂow analyses described in Sect. 4. Our new argu-
ment analysis improved precision from 61% to 100%.
7.3 Effects of Environment Sensitivity
We then made the models environmentsensitive. For each program, we manually iden-
tiﬁed executioncharacteristicsthat dependeduponenvironmentproperties.Stated more
formally,we deﬁnedthe functionsf ofDeﬁnition4 that describedata-ﬂowsfroman en-
vironmentpropertyto a programvariable used as a system-call argumentor as a branch
condition. Table 2 lists the dependencies added to the Dyck model for each program.
The system-call argument dependencies augmented values recovered using the static
data-ﬂow analyses presented in Sect. 4. Immediately before execution, the monitor in-
stantiates the model in the current environment by resolving the dependencies.procmail
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measure made safe by constraints upon their arguments. The Dyck model with no data-ﬂow
analysis constrained no arguments
Figure 10 reports the average reachability measure for each program’s execution
when monitored using these environment-sensitive models. Model precision has im-
proved from 76% (procmail) to 100% (gzip and cat). Both gzip and cat had
average reachability measures of zero, indicating that an adversary had no opportunity
to undetectably insert a malicious system call at any point in either process’ execution.
Successful argument recovery constrains system calls so that an attacker can no
longer use the calls in a malicious manner. We evaluated the ability of our techniques
to constrain system calls. Figure 11 shows the percentage of potentially malicious
system calls discovered during computation of the average reachability measure that
were restricted because of system call argument analysis and environment-sensitivity.
In this ﬁgure, higherbars represent the improvedconstraints uponsystem calls that pro-
duced the correspondinglylower bars previously shown in Fig. 10. For three programs,
mailx, gzip, and cat, environment-sensitive models constrained 99–100% of the
potentially dangerous calls.
We expect environment-sensitiveprogram models to affect the performanceof run-
time execution monitoring. The monitor must both update the program model at load
time to remove paths unreachable in the current environment and enforce context-
sensitive argument restrictions at every system call. Table 3 shows the execution time
overheadarising from the model update and the more precise enforcement.These over-
heads are modest: about one-half second for the short-lived processes procmail and
mailxandtwosecondsforthelonger-runningcat.Althoughtheoverheadsforproc-
mail and mailx are high when viewed as a percentage of the original runtime, this
occursduetotheshortlifetimeoftheseprocessesandthemonitor’supfrontﬁxedcostof
pruning unreachablepaths. Longer-livedprocesses such as cat give a better indication
of relative cost: here, 2.8%.
Further, improved argument recovery may increase the size of program models
as the model must contain the additional constraints. For all programs, environment-
sensitive models required 16 KB (2 pages) more memory than a Dyck model with no
argument recovery or environment-sensitivity.Table 3. Performance overheads due to execution enforcement using environment-sensitive mod-
els. Model update is the one-time cost of pruning from the model execution paths not allowed in
the current environment. The enforcement times include both program execution and veriﬁcation
of each system call executed against the program’s model
Program
No model update Environment-sensitive
Overhead
No enforcement Model update Enforcement Total
procmail 0.55 s 0.41 s 0.67 s 1.08 s 0.53 s
mailx (send) 0.08 s 0.38 s 0.16 s 0.54 s 0.46 s
mailx (receive) 0.07 s 0.38 s 0.14 s 0.52 s 0.45 s
gzip 6.26 s 0.00 s 6.11 s 6.11 s 0.00 s
cat 56.47 s 0.00 s 58.06 s 58.06 s 1.59 s
We believe that these results strongly endorse our proposed environment-sensitive
intrusion detection. The precision measurements demonstrate that with the right analy-
sis tools, program execution can be safely constrained to the point that attackers have
little ability to undetectably execute attacks against the operating system via a vulner-
able program. We certainly do not constrain all execution: for example, our models do
not enforce iteration counts on loops or verify data read or written to ﬁles. However,
we strongly limit process execution that can adversely affect the underlying operating
system or other processes executing simultaneously.
7.4 Evasion Attacks
Intrusiondetectionsystemsthat arenotenvironment-sensitivearesusceptibletoevasion
attacks. These attacks mimic correct process execution for some environment [18,21],
just not the current environment. To demonstrate the effectiveness of environment sen-
sitivity in defense against such attacks, we designed an attack against mailx that over-
writes command-linearguments stored in the process’ address space to change the pro-
cess’ execution. Although the original command line passed to the program directed it
to check for new mail and exit, our attack changes the environmentdata so that mailx
instead reads sensitive information and sends unwanted email.
Ourattackmakesuse ofabufferoverrunvulnerabilitywhenmailxunsafelycopies
thestring valueofthe HOMEenvironmentvariable.We assumethat theattackercanalter
the HOME variable, possibly before the monitor resolves environment dependencies.
The attacker changes the variable HOME to contain the code they wish to inject into
mailx. The exploit follows the typical “nop sled + payload + address” pattern [12].
1. The ﬁrst part consists of a sequence of nops (a “sled”) that exceeds the static buffer
size, followed by an instruction sequence to obtain the current address on the stack.
2. The payload then rewrites the command-line arguments in memory. The change
to the command-line arguments alters execution so that the process will perform a
different operation, here sending spam and leaking information.
3. The return address at the end of the payload is selected to reenter getopt so that
the new command-line arguments update appropriate state variables. If necessary,
an evasive exploit can alter its reentry point so that no additional system calls orstack frames occur between the overﬂow and the resumed ﬂow. In our attack, reen-
tering at getopt was sufﬁcient.
We implemented the mailx exploit, loaded it via HOME, and caused the program
to read arbitrary ﬁles and send unwanted email. Since the exploit did not introduce
additional system calls and reentered the original execution path, the attack perfectly
mimicked normal execution for some environment, with one exception caused by the
register windows used by the SPARC architecture. To effectively manipulate the return
address, exploit code must return from a callee function after corrupting the stack [12].
This “double return” makes exploit detection slightly easier on SPARC machines, be-
cause anexploitthat attemptsto reentera functionalters returnaddressesin a detectable
way. This attack limitation is not present on the more common x86 architecture.
Environment-sensitive models can detect these evasion attacks. The monitor re-
solves environment dependencies before process execution begins, and hence before
the attack alters the environmentdata. In this example, the execution paths that mailx
followed subsequent to the attack, reading sensitive ﬁles and sending email, do not
match the expected paths given the command-line input.
8 Conclusions
Program models used for model-based intrusion detection can beneﬁt from our new
analyses.Ourstatic argumentrecoveryreducesattackopportunitiessigniﬁcantlyfurther
than prior argument analysis approaches. Adding environment sensitivity continues to
strengthen program models by adding environment features to the models. The useful-
ness of these model-construction techniques is shown in the results, where the models
could severely constrain several test programs’ execution.
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